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Supporting the EU’s approach to climate change: The discourse of 
the transnational media within the ‘Brussels bubble’ 
Abstract 
The Union’s global climate change policy has been widely seen as an expression of its normative 
power, where it is committed to act through multilateral frameworks in order to tackle the effects 
of changes in the climate and safeguard the future of peoples around the world. Internally, the 
EU’s approach to climate change is complemented by high levels of support from citizens. This 
article explores another internal source of support for the EU’s leadership in global climate 
change policy, namely the media. The focus here is on the transnational media’s reporting and 
coverage of the Copenhagen summit, which is widely considered to be one of the key points in 
the development of global climate change policy. The article shows that within the ‘Brussels 
bubble’, the transnational media supported through its reporting the EU’s ambitious agenda in 
global climate change policy around the time of the Copenhagen summit. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In contrast to other issue areas in its foreign policy, the European Union (EU) has managed to 
achieve a significant level of coordination among the member states in its approach to climate 
change. The Union’s global climate change policy has been widely seen as an expression of its 
normative power, where it is committed to acting through multilateral frameworks in order to 
tackle the effects of changes in the climate and safeguard the future of peoples around the world 
(Bäckstrand and Elgström 2013; Karlsson et al. 2012). Leadership in global climate change 
policy has been high on the EU’s agenda; the Union aiming to serve as an example for other 
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countries, but also behaving as a norm setter (Parker et al. 2012). Internally, the EU’s approach 
to climate change is complemented by high levels of support from citizens, who recognize the 
need for the Union to take the lead in tackling the global effects of climate change (European 
Commission 2011).  
This article explores another internal source of support for the EU’s leadership in global climate 
change policy, namely the media1. Support is understood in this case to be the favorable 
discourse of the media towards the EU, which has the potential to grant more legitimacy to the 
Union’s policies – as the media is often thought to portray the view of the general public 
(Williams, 2006).  The article enquires whether the transnational media2 expressed support for 
the EU’s approach towards climate change around the 2009 Copenhagen summit. In doing so, 
the article highlights the way in which and why the transnational media constructed its discourse 
in this case. In the literature the transnational media has attracted little attention (both in the case 
of climate change and in general). Studies focusing on national media (with a preference for the 
Old member states) have underscored that media in the members states have backed-up the EU’s 
ambitions to act as leader in global climate change policy, but at the same time have not always 
been convinced that climate change should be a top policy priority for the Union (Smith 2005; 
Carvalho 2007; Carvalho and Burgess 2005). Moreover, these studies have shown that in 
national public spheres dominated by Eurosceptic media reporting, journalists portrayed a deep 
sense of doubt regarding the EU’s ability to convince states such as the US or China to agree to a 
progressive global agreement that could effectively tackle climate change. The EU’s failure at 
the Copenhagen summit was perceived by the UK or Swedish media as a sign that their states 
would be more effective acting unilaterally rather than through the common framework of the 
European Union (Gavin and Marshall 2011, 1138; Olausson 2010; Gavin et al. 2011). 
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In turn, this article shows that within the ‘Brussels bubble’, the transnational media supported 
through their reporting the EU’s ambitious agenda in global climate change policy around the 
time of the Copenhagen summit. The focus on transnational media is justified by the fact that 
within the ‘Brussels bubble’ EU policymakers tend value more the quality of the reporting of 
transnational media than that of national media (Baisnée 2007). This provides transnational 
journalists with a greater ability to make their discourse salient in the EU’s circles of power in 
Brussels. The ‘Brussels bubble’ is commonly understood to be ‘limited to an elite circle of 
mostly Brussels-based politicians, lobbyists and interest groups and the sphere of <<arcane>> 
policy, i.e. a setting in which participants exclusively operate behind closed doors and with a 
prime emphasis on interpersonal communication’ (Spanier 2012: 93). The ‘Brussels bubble’ is 
thus focused on specific European issues, mainly targets experts, interest groups, or journalists, 
and seeks to feed into debates around the EU’s decision-making. Additionally, those who read 
transnational publications (such as EUObserver, European Voice or the Financial Times) tend to 
be part of a mini audience based around and within the ‘Brussels bubble’. In order to analyze the 
effects of the ‘Brussels bubble’ the article relies on data from interviews and questionnaires with 
journalists working for transnational publications. These enquired into the motivations behind 
the discourse of transitional media and the way it was influenced by the ‘Brussels bubble’. 
By focusing on the discourse of the transnational media the article seeks to contribute to the 
literatures on media reporting on climate change and Euroscepticism in the European public 
sphere. More broadly, it also contributes to the literature on informal policy networks in EU 
policymaking as it highlights that the ‘Brussels bubble’ embedded journalists within a culture 
which made them less likely to adopt Eurosceptic views. In the ‘Brussels bubble’ journalists 
working for transnational media have been able to construct informal networks with EU 
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policymakers, who in turn value the quality of their reporting (Firmstone 2004). The article starts 
by exploring the EU’s engagement with global climate change policy. The characteristics of 
transnational publications together with the methods employed in the article are presented in the 
next two sections. Frame analysis is the primary method used for empirically analyzing the 
discourse of transnational media – and is supplemented by data from anonymous interviews and 
questionnaires with journalists from the three transnational publications. The reporting of the 
transnational media is analyzed empirically and discussed in the fourth section, followed by the 
conclusions of the article in the last section.  
THE UNION’S GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY 
The EU’s policy towards climate change can be seen to be the fusion between domestic and 
foreign policy, but also between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism. It reflects both the 
EU’s (and especially the Commission) aim to become a leader in tackling global climate change 
and the member states’ own ambitions and interests (Skovgaard 2014). Hence, in the case of 
international climate change negotiations the Commission negotiates on behalf of the member 
states, having a clear mandate from the Council presidency which acts as the EU’s main voice. 
This article focuses on the Copenhagen summit which took place in December 2009 and was 
widely seen as an opportunity for the EU to draw on its global leadership and drive forward a 
progressive agreement. Although the EU displayed leadership in the run-up to the Copenhagen 
summit, by promising funding to developing states, the events during the summit point to the 
idea that the Union lost its position as global leader in climate change policy. The US and the 
BASIC countries (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) drafted the final version of the 
Copenhagen Accord, constraining the EU to accept the deal. Curtin (2010: p.25) highlights that 
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at the time among worldwide media ‘there was a recognition that the EU had been upstaged at 
best and humiliated at worst’. The Union’s multilateral approach had been replaced by a more 
unilateral approach supported by the US and China. Even the European media argued that ‘the 
truth about Copenhagen is that (…) the EU completely failed to show leadership on 
environmental matters’ (Kilian and Elgström 2010: 258) 
According to Egenhofer and Georgiev (2010), Europe’s failure at the Copenhagen summit must 
not come as a shock, for the EU was at the time a minor power in global emissions – and only 
developing countries can matter in terms of implementing sustainable solutions. Moreover, at the 
time, China and the US were highly constrained by their domestic institutions and circumstances 
to search for unilateral solutions (Christoff 2010: 644). Nonetheless, following the Copenhagen 
summit, the Commission argued that its efforts were a success because the member states (which 
were also committed to ambitious emission reduction targets and to the use of environmental 
friendly technology) managed to provide a worthy example to small and island states. The EU 
also managed to attain a significant degree of coordination among the member states, ensuring 
that they acted unitedly – an example on which the EU drew during the following summits on 
climate change in Cancun, Durban and Doha, where it managed to form a broad coalition with 
small and island states. Conversely, at latter summits, the EU had a much better performance as 
it decreased its goals, siding with small and islands states, whilst also acting as a ‘bridge-builder 
between the major blocs trying to tilt the balance’ (Oberthür 2011: 10). The Copenhagen summit 
can also be seen as a ‘wake-up call for the EU’, as it made the Union change its strategy from 
leading by example to building wide coalitions that could effectively negotiate with the US and 
China in multilateral frameworks (Bäckstrand and Elgström 2013: 1380). The next section 
discusses the characteristics of the transnational media, by focusing on the habits of journalists 
6 
 
within the ‘Brussels bubble’ and the three transnational publications selected for empirical 
analysis. 
TRANSNATIONAL MEDIA WITHIN THE ‘BRUSSELS BUBBLE’ 
The analysis included two newspapers and one online publication: the Financial Times (FT)3, the 
European Voice (EV)4 and the EUObserver.com – which has a similar readership and coverage 
to the other two publications. None of these publications can be considered to be truly a 
‘European newspaper’ because they do not aim to direct their discourse towards the general 
public living in the member states. In a 2004 EUROPUB report on the way transnational 
European media report on EU topics, Firmstone (2004: 8) found that transnational journalists 
believe that their European message cannot get across to individuals in the member states due to 
national media which report mainly through domestic perspectives. However, these publications 
can be thought of as ‘European wide’ or transnational media because their discourse usually 
transcends the boundaries of nation states and is almost never solely concerned with covering 
domestic politics within a single member state. Transnational publications frequently employ 
freelancers and their articles are quoted or even translated by publications in the EU’s member 
states, as they are seen to contain expert and in-depth analysis of EU issues. Moreover, according 
to Panichi (2012), national correspondents do not have the same level and quality of access to 
inside information about the EU’s policies or decision-making, and rarely do more research than 
that presented in the transnational media or made available by the EU’s institutions thorough 
formal channels. 
Transnational journalists share a cosmopolitan ideology underpinned by deep Euro-optimism, 
which also compels them to maintain high professional standards (Lecheler and Hinrichsen 
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2010; Lecheler 2008; Williams 2006). On the other hand, Heikkilä and Kunelius’ (2006: 73) 
study emphasizes that generally the EU is very successful in influencing the discourse of the 
transnational media. They point to the overarching power of the ‘Brussels bubble’ to entrench a 
certain sphere of values in the writing styles of transnational journalists. In their extensive report 
on the habits and culture of journalists based in Brussels, they find that individuals working for 
transnational media tend to approach European issues from a ‘cosmopolitan’ perspective. More 
specifically, this involves refraining from vigorously criticizing the EU and not publishing 
articles that contain negative stereotypes or references to the Union. Transnational journalists 
also have a tendency ‘to develop a reaction of protecting the institution, a kind of self-censorship 
which they justify by their belief that the Commission is acting for the public good’ (Baisnée, 
2002, p.120). Moreover, according to the interviews, transnational journalists often take cues 
from spokespersons and accept planted questions during press conferences or even publish 
stories requested by their contacts (Interviews 1, 2, 3, 4).  
Journalists working for transnational publications that have been based for a considerable time in 
Brussels have largely pro-EU attitudes and are in a better position to influence the Union’s 
agenda (Baisnée 2002). They have had the opportunity to build close ties with EU policymakers, 
making them responsive to their (transnational journalists) discourse. Their ability is in stark 
contrast to that of ‘newcomers’ and especially correspondents for national media who do not 
keep their posts for more than a few years and are more prone to be constrained by the 
scrutinizing needs of their editorial offices back home and by their lack of access to 
policymakers. On the other hand, journalists working for transnational media either see 
themselves as trying to enact the highest journalistic standards or trying to campaign for a certain 
point of view and policy initiative, almost never portraying any sense of Euroscepticism 
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(Lecheler and Hinrichsen 2010). Through their campaigning efforts they usually try to build 
support in order ‘to reinforce [their] own opinions among those who are politically close’ within 
the EU’s institutions (Mancini 1993: 49).  On the other hand, data from the interviews conducted 
for this article correlates with the findings of EUROPUB project, in that according to 
transnational journalists, spokespersons working for the Commission do have not sufficient 
expertise in their area, and behave merely as PR staff or even salesmen of the benefits of 
European integration (Firmstone, 2004, p.24).  
The Financial Times (FT) is widely considered to be the most important transnational newspaper 
(Baisnée 2002; Raeymaeckers and Cosjin 2006; Balčytienėet al. 2006). Raeymaeckers and his 
colleagues (2007: 115) found that the FT has a privileged position within the ‘Brussels bubble’. 
It enjoys a considerable amount of prestige, often being considered by policymakers in Brussels 
the only true European newspaper. Its status is built on greater access to resources than other 
transnational media and a commitment to thorough and critical reporting, providing a prime 
example of quality journalism. The FT has the largest press bureau based in Brussels which 
reports both on the day to day activities5 of European institutions, and also on political and 
economic developments in the member states and other countries in Europe. However, articles 
tend to be tailored for a European business oriented readership, the newspaper affording the 
majority of its space to issues concerning stocks and shares, financial markets, or companies in 
Europe. The FT shapes its discourse in order to cater for the interests of ‘national governments, 
EU institutions and European political parties as well as its readership’ (Firmstone 2004: 34).  
European Voice (EV) focuses on presenting information and analyses about the EU and its 
institutions on a weekly basis, catering for ‘everyone involved in European Union policy 
making, those who seek to influence the decision-making process from outside, and those whose 
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work is directly affected by decisions taken in Brussels’ (Firmstone 2004: 2). It reports on the 
day to day activity of the EU’s institutions, portraying an overt optimism towards furthering the 
European project, which matches the views of its readership. However, due to its weekly 
publication cycle it does not cover day to day events, but provides in-depth analyses of events 
that have happened throughout the previous week. Finally, EUObserver.com is an online 
publication which aims ‘to support the debate on – and development of European affairs’6. It 
publishes daily analyses and news reports which focus on the day to day activity of the EU. With 
four to five stories published online each day written in a similar manner to newspaper articles, it 
is comparable in terms of space and coverage to both the FT and EV7. Similarly to EV, it 
practices a type of cosmopolitan journalism, highly optimistic regarding the European project. 
The readership of EUObserver tends to have considerable knowledge of and interest in EU 
affairs. Nonetheless, due to its online open-source character, articles and points of view 
published by EUObserver are more often quoted in national media. The next section explores the 
methods employed for empirically analyzing the selected transnational media.  
METHODOLOGY 
This article surveys the discourse of the transnational media within two six month periods before 
and after the Copenhagen summit (1 July 2009-1 July 2010). Media items were selected keyword 
searches on Lexis-Nexis, table 1 detailing the distribution of the selected articles in the 
transnational publications. Frame analysis was the primary method used for analyzing the 
discourse of transnational media. Through framing the media articulates its discourse and gets it 
across to the general public, and more importantly to policymakers. A focus on frame analysis 
allows for the identification of the way in which the discourse of the media is categorized around 
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a series of central opinions and ideas. Frame analysis underscores the connections made by the 
journalists between different events, policies or phenomena and their possible interpretations 
(Carvalho and Burgess 2005). In the first instance, the frame analysis implied a quantitative 
descriptive analysis of the frames constructed by the media was operated. More specifically, for 
each frame, the number of articles containing it was weighed against the total number of selected 
articles. The same process was then broken down and repeated for each publication, thus 
providing greater comparative depth to the study. At this stage, media coverage was also 
correlated with the frames constructed by the media as a means of uncovering their temporal 
relevance. The final part of the frame analysis focused qualitatively on the strategies employed 
by the media in order to select and emphasize certain aspects of reality, events, ideas or 
perceptions, whilst downplaying others. The analysis shows that in most cases the three 
transnational publications constructed the same frame. Throughout the next section these frames 
are emphasised through quotes from various articles in the sample which capture the framing 
activities of all three publications. Conversely, the analysis also focuses on the few cases where 
the three publications reported differently on similar frames.  
The frame analysis was triangulated with data from anonymous interviews and questionnaires 
with 6 journalists who covered climate change issues in the three transnational publications 
during the period analysed8. The interviews and questionnaires with journalists covered topics 
related to the internal and external factors that influence the way policy definitions are 
constructed by the media, in this way taking into the account the complex nature of the 
relationship between journalists and policymakers. The internal factors included issues 
concerning: perceptions of readers’ demand, resources made available by various actors, quality 
of information from the EU as a source; while the external touched upon topics related to: 
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framing and commenting strategies, targeting strategies or reporting strategies. More specific 
questions focused on the discourse of journalists within the ‘Brussels bubble’ and the way they 
reported on the on the EU’s climate change policy during the period analyzed. 
ANALYSIS 
The most salient frame identified in the sample referred to the long term risks associated with 
climate change and defined it as a top policy problem due to its broad and indiscriminate effects 
on peoples around the world. About 98 per cent of the total articles (see table 1) included this 
frame, advising but also praising EU policymakers for considering climate change as a policy 
priority, because it possessed the potential to harm the livelihood of future generations. This 
frame also converged with EU policymakers’ own approaches, as the Union’s rhetoric 
highlighted the major challenge that climate change brought to global governance and to the 
security and economic development of the member states. Both before and after the Copenhagen 
summit, the Union overtly stated its commitment to a low carbon society – by increasing its 
reduction targets from 20% to 30% (European Commission 2010a; European Commissioner for 
Climate Action 2010a) – which was thought to ‘create new jobs and industries and will 
contribute to a more energy secure future’ (Council of the European Union 2009). Transnational 
journalists took cues here and drew on EU policymakers’ discourse in order to make their 
readers conscious of the medium to long term consequences of climate change (Interviews 1, 2, 
3, 4, 5, 6). The three publications also provided detailed scientific evaluations and reports from 
transnational NGOs which highlighted the malign effects that climate change could have on a 




Insert table 1 here 
Defining climate change as a major risk also resonated with views from other influential 
international actors such as the UN, or various transnational environmental NGOs, which made 
the frame even more salient – together with the fact that it was perceived to affect populations 
globally. Keeping to its deep commitment to objective reporting, the transnational media 
presented statements and points of view from actors outside foreign policy circles. These 
statements were featured in order to highlight the weaknesses of defining climate change as a 
major problem that the EU had to tackle. Conversely, although most articles framed climate 
change as an important threat to the wellbeing of future generations, not all of them considered 
that the need to tackle the effects of climate change had to be backed-up by substantive financial 
commitments. EUObserver (11 November 2009) noted that finances could be better spent on 
creating jobs. On the other hand, the FT highlighted that by committing itself to progressive 
measures meant to tackle climate change, the EU might be placed in a disadvantaged position, 
running the risk of driving ‘industry out of the region if it continues to push for deeper cuts in 
carbon dioxide emissions than other economies’ (Financial Times, 7 July 2009).  
A considerably lower number of articles (than those which framed climate change as a medium 
to long term threat) suggested that climate change was a present emergency that had to be 
addressed urgently. According to the FT (7 July 2009), the world had no excuse for denying the 
short term-risks associated with climate change. World leaders were advised to add urgency to 
the negotiations on climate change in order to achieve a progressive agreement (EUObserver, 6 
October 2009). Transnational journalists constructed this frame by frequently featuring detailed 
scientific reports and analyses, together with official assessments from the UN and various 
transnational environmental NGOs. Moreover, the views of the general public were at times 
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portrayed by the three transnational publications through letters and comments from their 
readers. This happened because some transnational journalists perceived themselves as educators 
who had the duty to inform individuals regarding the EU’s approach which was infused with 
principles and values related to justice, human rights and equality (Interviews 1, 2, 3, 5, 6). 
Transnational journalists also aimed to encourage public debate within the ‘Brussels bubble’ by 
providing individuals with detailed scientific accounts regarding the effects of climate change. 
Table 1 shows that central to the way in which the media reported during the period analyzed 
was the idea that the Copenhagen summit represented a crucial moment – which is also 
highlighted by the spike in coverage in the period around the summit seen in  figure 1. There the 
EU was expected to lead the adoption of a binding agreement that could tackle the effects of 
climate change. Multiple articles drew on scientific reports or academic assessments in order to 
capture the magnitude of the summit which was seen as the ‘biggest show on Earth, and, for 
scientists at least, the most important meeting the world has ever known’ (EUObserver, 7 
December 2009), where more than 15.000 delegates from 192 countries met. At the same time, 
the three transnational publications often published reports which contained views from the 
general public or from various environmental groups and NGOs, together with public opinion 
polls (which emphasized the high level of public expectations associated with the summit).  
 
Insert figure 1 here 
 
The importance of the summit was an idea promoted by the EU from as early as 2008, the 
European Parliament even claiming in a resolution that it was the most important international 
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meeting of the last decade (European Parliament 2009). Moreover, both the three transnational 
publications and EU policymakers associated high hopes with the prospect of national leaders for 
the first time having the opportunity of negotiating a climate change agreement face to face, as 
Connie Hedegaard stressed: ‘the negotiators have been sitting opposite each other for years 
arguing from the same positions (...) that is why it is so crucial that the leaders say forging an 
agreement in Copenhagen is what they want to do. That will let [the negotiators depart from 
here’ (Financial Times, 7 July 2009). In this sense, transnational journalists view the EU as the 
most complex administrative system in the world that has the potential of being more open to 
public debate than the nation state (Lecheler and Hinrichsen, 2010). They contend that the EU 
has the potential, and widely expect it to behave as a normative actor and live up to its 
commitments and ambitious rhetoric in the case of climate change, but also more generally 
(Interviews  1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6). 
High expectations were associated by the transnational media with the EU’s potential to draw on 
its global leadership and drive forward a fair and progressive agreement on climate change. 
Before the summit, the Union was praised for its key role in supporting the Kyoto Protocol and 
its ability to arrive at a common stance between member states, in this way serving as a model 
for other countries. On the other hand, the FT frequently covered disagreements between 
member states, which were framed as a major hurdle that could have damaged the EU's capacity 
to act as a leader by example. It argued that the EU’s approach could have attained credibility 
and legitimacy globally only if member states managed to work together and synchronize with 
the efforts of the Commission. Among the member states, the three transnational publications 
underscored that Britain was at the forefront of the EU’s efforts, proposing deeper commitments 
than any other member state.  
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Throughout the six month period before the summit, the wavering position of the member states 
– which continuously moved from supporting a 30 per cent cut in emissions to only 20 percent 
and back – was seen by the transnational media as a sign of weakness that could have 
endangered the Union’s negotiating power and credibility in Copenhagen. Poland and Estonia 
were among the most vocal opponents of committing the EU to ambitious emissions reductions. 
They went as far as challenging in court the proposals of the Commission, in order to develop 
burden-sharing agreements that involved the new member states from Central and Eastern 
Europe being compensated for their emissions (EUObserver 30 October 2009). Conversely, in 
situations when the possibility of forging a common European position was bleak, being overrun 
by discussions of downgrading the EU’s commitments, the three transnational publications were 
keen to argue that the Union had the duty to set and promote ambitious goals in global climate 
change policy. On the other hand, especially EUObserver, drawing on the perceived support of 
public opinion, highlighted Europe’s duty and potential to lead in global climate change policy, 
because the environment, as a whole, was ‘one of the few areas where the EU has consistently 
won respect and recognition from its citizens’ (European Voice 19 October 2009). Moreover, 
with the adoption of the Lisbon treaty, the three publications were optimistic about the prospect 
of the Commission having a better position in coagulating a common EU approach, which would 
have increased its power and role in global climate change negotiations. Moreover, according to 
the interviews, through its reporting the transnational media reinforced the fact that the EU was 
justified in trying to secure a global deal on climate (Interviews 1, 2, 3, 6). 
The transnational media also framed an expectation which argued that the EU should commit 
even more resources in order to tackle climate change globally. Journalists acted here as activists 
drawing on the EU’s own ambitions of leading in global climate change policy, together with the 
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pleas coming from various environmental groups for immediate action. In this way, they exerted 
pressure on EU policymakers to adopt even more ambitious goals and implement them. 
Moreover, transnational journalists’ tendency to argue that the EU should engage even more in 
tackling climate change was fuelled by their belief in the ability of the Union to act in the 
international arena for the well-being of other peoples (Lecheler and Hinrichsen 2010). 
The transnational media found itself in agreement with the Union’s institutions all of which 
advocated an agreement where both developed and developing countries would ‘contribute 
adequately according to their responsibilities and respective capabilities’ (European 
Commissioner for Climate Action 2010b). The EU was praised for proposing that rich countries 
should step up and commit up to 50 billion Euros each year until 2020. However, failing to 
convince states such as the US, China, Australia or Japan to aid developing and poor countries, 
made the Union back down from its ambitious stance, committing to offer in the run-up to the 
Copenhagen summit only around 7 billion Euros over the following three years. This downgrade 
was severely criticized by the transnational media (EUObserver, 11 December 2009; European 
Voice, 3 December 2009). The three transnational publications viewed equality, burden-sharing 
and solidarity to be integral to any solution meant to tackle the effects of global climate change. 
The construction of this frame involved acknowledging that the larger part of the emissions 
which have caused changes in climate were produced during the 18th and 19th centuries by 
Western developed countries – contributing to their development and increasing the welfare of 
their citizens. Hence, rich countries were seen as having the duty to compensate developing 
countries for the cost that adopting progressive climate change policies would entail: ‘the world's 
poorest countries who are already struggling to survive in a changing climate, need action, not 
more hollow promises’ (EUObserver, 6 November 2009). 
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Putting the blame on other states for hampering the EU’s efforts to drive forward a progressive 
agreement was a strategy employed by EU policymakers in order to pressure states such as 
China or the US, and build internal consensus (and confidence) within the EU.  Numerous 
statements from EU policymakers were featured in the three publications in order to give weight 
to this frame: for example, according to Connie Hedegaard, Commissioner for Climate Action, 
‘climate change can be controlled only if all major emitters take action (...) the most convincing 
leadership Europe can show is to take tangible and determined action to become the most climate 
friendly region in the world’ (European Commission 2010b). However, EU policymakers felt 
that the high degree of transparency that the EU creates in its approach to climate change by 
making expectations clear – to the media, the general public and other states – can have a 
damaging effect on its ability to negotiate with China or the US (Christoff 2010). Due to the 
activity of the media which publicizes and multiplies the Union’s ambitions in climate change, 
the EU was deprived of any leverage in its intergovernmental negotiations with other states, 
which were aware of the EU’s position and could disregard it. The reverse argument claims that 
enhanced publicity for the EU’s approach to climate change can gather support from less 
influential states, which feel disaffected by the US and China’s attitude (Kelemen 2010). 
The outcome of the summit was largely framed by the transnational media as a failure, where the 
EU drafted ambitious plans which were not matched by policy successes. The transnational 
media defined the disappointing result of the Copenhagen summit as a problem which had to be 
urgently tackled in the near future. Moreover, the outcome of the Copenhagen summit prompted 
the media to argue that because the EU had not materialized its ambitious goals it had effectively 
lost its leadership in global climate change policy. For example, according to an environmental 
analysis featured in the FT, the summit represented a ‘climate Waterloo for the EU’ where ‘there 
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was the motivation to be the clear driver in the negotiations, but they were more or less kicked 
out at the end’ (Financial Times, 22 December 2009). The EU was criticized for not being able 
to take lead of the negotiations and not striking a deal ‘directly with China, India, South Africa 
and Ethiopia’ (European Voice, 14 January 2010). Nevertheless, EV maintained its supportive 
tone, highlighting that the most important achievement for the Union at the summit was captured 
by its ability to harmonize the attitude of the 27 member states before Copenhagen.  
Articles also warned about a stalemate at Copenhagen in the run-up and during the summit, 
arguing that the EU didn’t manage to build a successful negotiating position that would have 
allowed it to discuss on equal footing with China and the US. This frame was constructed by the 
transnational media featuring views from academia and the global NGO community which 
criticized the EU for not having a stronger position that could have made the agreement more 
transparent. However, the transnational media linked this frame to division among the member 
states which resonated with the views of the Commission. Here, the three transnational 
publications anticipated the breakdown of the negotiations, underscoring the Union’s isolation 
and the tendency of a small number of the member states to promote different agendas during the 
summit (EUObserver, 3 May 2010).  
Although a large number of articles considered that Europe’s achievements at the Copenhagen 
summit fell short of its ambitious goals, in the six month period that followed the summit 
transnational journalists emphasized that the EU had the potential to regain its leadership 
position, or had not even lost it in the first place. The EU’s official rhetoric argued that the 
Copenhagen summit represented a success for the Union and a crucial step forward in tackling 
global climate change. The Copenhagen accord was supported by 109 states, whilst small and 
island states took account and seemed to be convinced by the Union’s global approach as it 
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showed the ‘determination of most countries to act on climate change now’ (European 
Commission 2010b). This frame was forged around a rather biased interpretation of the 
outcomes of the summit promoted by the European Commission (2010a). Here, the Union’s 
capacity to cooperate with small and island states or poor countries was perceived to be a major 
breakthrough that could have led in the near future to a binding global agreement. In this way 
transnational journalists fuelled and legitimized a new approach from the Commission based on 
convincing small and island states, rather than major actors (Interviews  1, 2, 4, 5, 6) – a strategy 
which proved successful during the subsequent summits in Cancun and Durban (Roberts, Parks 
and Vásquez, 2011). 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The analysis points to the fact that transnational journalists, deeply immersed in the ‘Brussels 
bubble’, rarely go out of their way to criticize the EU’s approach to climate change. The 
‘Brussels bubble’ infuses journalists with a sense of optimism regarding European integration 
and the EU’s ability and duty to play a key role in tackling the global effects of climate change. 
This policy area can be seen as the overlapping between supranationalism and 
intergovernmentalism. Consequently, this article contributes to the literature on media reporting 
within the European public sphere, but also sheds light on the effects of the ‘Brussels bubble’ on 
the reporting of the transnational media. This is in contrast with the reporting of national media 
within the member states which emphasized around the time of the Copenhagen summit to the 
EU’s inability to convince China or the US to bind themselves to a progressive agreement, or 
was characterized by Euroscepticism (Gavin and Marshall 2011; Christoff 2010; Curtin 2010). 
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On most occasions, the transnational media acted as a third arm of the EU, publicizing and 
aiming to gather public support for its policies (Interviews 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6).  
The prime expectation put forward by the transnational media involved the EU’s ability to drive 
forward negotiations on a progressive agreement at the Copenhagen summit. Accordingly, the 
transnational media underscored the magnitude of the international event and its overall 
importance and meaning for the future of peoples around the world. By presenting numerous 
statements from EU policymakers who expressed high hopes regarding the potential outcome of 
the summit, the transnational media reinforced and unpacked EU official discourse for the 
understanding of the general public. Linked to this, media frames expressed an expectation that if 
the EU was to lead in global climate change it would need to act united. At times, journalists 
working for the three publications also acted as activists pushing for a stronger EU presence in 
global climate change policy, because, as one article in EV put it, climate change was ‘one of the 
few areas where the EU has consistently won respect and recognition from its citizens’ 
(European Voice, 19 October 2009).  
According to the journalists interviewed, their support for the EU’s policy towards climate 
change was legitimized by the conviction that individuals across the member states supported a 
progressive and strong stance from the EU (Interviews 2, 3, 4, 5, 6). Moreover, transnational 
journalists’ tendency to argue that the EU should engage even more in tackling climate change 
was fuelled by their belief in the ability of the Union to act in the international arena for the well-
being of other peoples (Interviews 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6). Transnational journalists tend to perceive that 
the interest of individuals in European issues is continuously growing due to the increasing role 
of the Union in tackling the financial crisis, global climate change, or its overall status in the 
international arena (Interviews 1, 2, 3, 4, 5). The most pervasive role that transnational 
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journalists assume is that of educators or mediators within the public sphere. This provides them 
with the power to fill the knowledge gaps of individuals surrounding the EU and to teach them 
how to view the Union – and its policy towards climate change. More specifically, this involved 
refraining from vigorously criticizing the EU and not publishing articles that contain negative 
stereotypes or references to the Union.  
Transnational journalists’ networks of informal ties with EU policymakers within the ‘Brussels 
bubble’ allowed them to convey their perceived image of public opinion, which facilitated 
linking individuals to EU decision-making. Trust relations were enhanced by the fact that some 
EU policymakers dealing with climate change also had experience of working within the media 
(Interviews 2, 4, 5, 6). Information is usually acquired through informal means, which, in time, 
build a deep sense of trust between transnational journalists and EU policymakers. This leads to 
the fact that sometimes transnational journalists publish articles that are fed by the EU’s 
institutions and support various policies. On the other hand, these relationships gave the 
opportunity to transnational journalists to put pressure on EU policymakers through their efforts 
to define two pervasive frames: around the crucial moment that Copenhagen represented in 
development of global climate change policy and the fact that the EU should make even more 
ambitious commitments (Interviews  1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6). At times, journalists working for the three 
publications also acted as activists pushing for a stronger EU presence in global climate change 
policy. Journalists acted here as activists drawing on the EU’s own ambitions of leading in global 
climate change policy, together with the pleas coming from various environmental groups for 
immediate action. In this way, they aimed to exert pressure on EU policymakers to adopt even 
more ambitious goals and implement them.  
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The three transnational publications claimed that the Union failed miserably and lost its 
leadership at the Copenhagen summit, being shunned by China and the US – in this way 
damaging the Union’s reputation. The failure of the Copenhagen summit was defined as a 
problem by the transnational media, which urged the EU to take visible steps in order to 
convince other states to bind themselves to a progressive agreement – in contrast to the frame 
focusing on the loss of leadership. In the six month period that followed the summit, the 
transnational media underscored that the EU still had the potential to lead in global climate 
change policy. In this way, transnational journalists fuelled and legitimized a new approach from 
the Commission based on convincing small and island states, rather than major actors – a 
strategy which proved successful during the subsequent summits in Cancun and Durban. 
 These findings also point to the fact that within the ‘Brussels bubble’ Eurosceptic journalism 
seems to be almost non-existent in the discourse of transnational media towards global climate 
change policy. Criticism towards the EU only surfaced in relation to the Union’s inability to live 
up to its ambitious goals or the tendency of some member states to act individually while 
disregarding the common values shared by the Union. Moreover, the Copenhagen summit should 
be seen as a point of reference for the way in which the transnational media presented the EU’s 
leadership in global climate change policy. During the next summits, in the background of the 
financial crisis, the EU and its member states afforded less attention to climate change. Hence, 
future research should enquire into whether coverage by the transnational media and its support 
for the EU’s leadership in global climate change policy has also decreased in this period. The 
focus on climate change could be complemented by comparing it with other policy areas or issue 
areas in the EU’s foreign policy. However, global climate change policy is made salient by the 
fact that is an issue area of foreign policy where member states are willing to a greater extent to 
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deal through the common framework of the EU and delegate more power to the Commission 
(Christoff 2010; Kilian and Elgström 2010). 
A further step in the analysis would be to look at how social media is used in the ‘Brussels 
bubble’ by the EU’s institutions and other actors (such as transitional publications, lobby groups, 
civil society groups). Nonetheless, Lambrecht emphasizes that the effect of conversations within 
the ‘Brussels bubble’ on digital platforms have been limited as ‘<<normal>> citizens are 
excluded from debates and conversations delivered in highly technical <<jargon>>’. He 
concludes that social networking has transformed the ‘Brussels bubble’, but has not expanded it 
or made it more inclusive (Lambrecht 2012). Moreover, as Gareth (2014) shows the number of 
national correspondents in Brussels has been constantly rising in the background of the financial 
crisis, future research could also focus on the discourse of national media and their 
correspondents within the ‘Brussels bubble’, and their reporting on the EU’s global climate 
change policy or other policy areas. 
NOTES 
1 In this article the term ‘media’ is used mostly as a singular noun to express the aggregate of 
journalists and publications – together with the underlying communities and institutions they 
create. ‘Media’ is also rarely used throughout the text as a plural noun to refer to the plurality of 
publications within the transnational landscape. 
2 Transnational media are considered here to aim to transcend national boundaries and 
address audiences in more than one EU member state. 
3 The FT refers here to its European edition which should be distinguished from the British edition. 
It is mostly similar to the British version, but has a larger emphasis on European issues. 
4 Owned by the Economist Group. 
5 Simultaneously, it tries to be a ‘paper of record’, following closely and mapping the activity of 
the EU’s institutions. 
6 Available at http://euobserver.com/static/about. 
7 The similarity in coverage between the three publications adds validity to the comparative 
approach employed here. However, journalists writing for the EUObserver benefit from less 
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stringent space restrictions – due to the nature of online media – which allow them to develop 
more detailed analyses. Articles published in EV very often also contain complex analyses 
because of its weekly publication cycle. 
8 The interviews and questionnaires were conducted between April 2011 and March 2013. Since 
around two journalists from each publication in the sample covered the issue of climate change 
this cross-section paints a reliable picture.  
Interviewee list: 
1. Freelancer and Financial Times, interview and questionnaire, Brussels, 08/04/2011. 
2. Freelancer and EUOberver.com, interview and questionnaire, Brussels, 12/04/2011. 
3. Freelancer and European Voice, interview and questionnaire, Brussels, 09/04/2011. 
4. European Voice, interview and questionnaire, 26/03/2013. 
5. Freelancer and EUOberver.com, questionnaire, 26/03/2013. 
6. Financial Times, questionnaire, 27/03/2013. 
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Figure 1: Coverage in transnational media of climate change (number of articles/month). 
 
Source: Author’s own calculations 
 
 














Climate change – medium to long term 
threat 
156 97.50 100.0 93.00 97.30 
Disappointing outcome at Copenhagen 38** 80.90** 85.70*** 70.60*** 88.90*** 
Copenhagen – a crucial moment  123 76.90 86.30 58.10 78.40 
The EU lost its global leadership after 
Copenhagen  
32** 68.10** 71.40*** 58.80*** 77.80*** 
Climate change is happening now  102 63.80 66.30 58.10 64.90 
The EU is the only actor that can forge a 
global agreement on climate change 
101 63.10 68.80 65.10 48.60 
The EU still has the potential to globally 
lead in climate change  
28** 59.60** 76.20*** 41.20*** 55.60*** 
                                                          
1 Table 1 highlights that the variation in the discourse of the three transnational publications was low, except in 








Jul-09 Aug-09 Sep-09 Oct-09 Nov-09 Dec-09 Jan-10 Feb-10 Mar-10 Apr-10 May-10 Jun-10
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The EU should do more 92 57.50 57.50 67.40 45.90 
Blaming other states 89 55.60 62.50 30.20 70.30 
Equal climate change deal 62 38.80 46.30 37.20 24.30 
Source: Author’s own calculations. 
Notes: * Percentages show the proportion of articles from each newspaper that feature the frames identified. 
            **Takes into account the articles published after the Copenhagen summit (N=47). 
            ***Takes into account the articles published after the Copenhagen summit: EUObserver (N=21); European 
Voice (N=17); FT (N=9). 
Source: Actor’s own calculations: (N=160) / EUObserver (N=80); European Voice (N=43); FT (N=37). 
 
 
